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A SPEECH ON THE STRUCTURAL
CONSTITUTION AND THE STIMULUS
PROGRAM
Richard A. Epstein*
The current stimulus measures enacted by Congress have
given rise to a number of complex constitutional issues at both
the state and federal levels: the system of checks and balances
within the federal government and the distribution of powers
between the federal and the state government. The proximate
cause for this speech-not in the tort sense, but in the
motivational sense-is the recent decision of the South Carolina
Supreme Court in Edwards v. Sanford,1 which raised yet another
novel variation on an important theme. How does the doctrine of
separation of powers as it operates at the state level interact with
the basic principles of federalism in situations where the federal
government chooses to make available funds to the state
government? Does the power to accept or reject that gift reside
with the governor or the legislature of the state? Edwards
resolved that question in favor of the legislature when it held
that the governor was not given the power to make a decision
about appropriations that the South Carolina Constitution
reserved for the legislature. In this particular context, it meant
that Governor Sanford was not in a position to exercise his
independent judgment to turn down the stimulus money which
the legislature had decided to accept.
Edwards was not, of course, as easy as all this sounded
because the particular language of the stimulus legislation,
grandly entitled the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of

* Richard Epstein is the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of
Law at the University of Chicago, director of the Law and Economics Program,
and the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution.
This is an edited and footnoted speech given by Professor Epstein during a
debate at the Charleston School of Law on October 8, 2009.
1. 678 S.E.2d 412 (S.C. 2009).
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2009 (ARRA),2 does at one point give the governor the power to
apply for funds. But a fuller reading of the entire statute makes
it clear that the governor does not have the independent
authority on that question, as section 1607(b) provides: "If funds
provided to any State in any division of this Act are not accepted
for use by the Governor, then acceptance by the State legislature,
by means of the adoption of a concurrent resolution, shall be
sufficient to provide funding to such State."3
Chief Justice Toal was entirely correct in rejecting the
governor's position that ARRA meant to cast aside all the state
constitutional rules on separation of power, which defined the
relative roles of the governor and the legislature. It may be that
the federal government could overrule the state constitution as it
applies to the internal distribution of powers within the state by
allowing the state's governor to decide whether or not to make
the appropriate applications for federal funds. But it would be
most unwise to read that aggressive intention into federal
legislation when there is any ambiguity in the language of the
statutory command. If one ever wants a case in which grammar
really matters, Edwards is it. If you decide that the proper
applicant is the governor, then you do have a constitutional
revolution. If, on the other hand, you decide it is the state
legislature that has that power, the governor's role is just to
execute the legislature's commands by filing the applicable
papers, which is the type of executive action that is subject to the
writ of mandate that the South Carolina Supreme Court granted
in this case.
I think, therefore, that on the legal issues, the South
Carolina Supreme Court was right to conclude that ARRA did
not intend to alter the distribution of power between the
governor and legislature of the state. I also agree with its view
that the questions of constitutional structure and statutory
interpretation must be decided independently of one's views of
the merits of ARRA or the wisdom of a state decision to
participate in the program. I might add that I reach this
conclusion even though my own libertarian small-government
2. Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 14005, 123 Stat 115 (2009).
3. Id. § 1607(b).
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instincts are deeply troubled at the injection of this much
government control over the operation of the economy. But at
this point we touch on a theme that deserves more elaboration:
What is it that South Carolina, or any other state, can do to stop
the train once the federal government has made its allocations
under ARRA?
For openers, there is little doubt that the legislature
understands the value of a new dollar, even one that is subject to
some strings, which in this case are not that tight, given that
section 1607(c) of AIRRA leaves the allocation of funds largely in
state hands.4 The clear implication is that even if the legislature
manifestly thought that the taxes that citizens of South Carolina
paid to fund ARRA imposed costs that exceeded the benefits that
the ARRA program generated to South Carolina citizens, the
legislature would still vote to accept the money. There is no way
that the federal government will exempt South Carolina citizens
from the tax. At this point, the legislature might as well take
money that otherwise will be distributed to other states.
This set of economic incentives thus brings us to this
question: Given the dynamics at the state level, what happens
when we shift our gaze just a little bit to think about the
processes that occur at the federal level to generate these
programs? In particular, is there any way that one could raise
constitutional doubts about the program when it is for practical
reasons impossible to decline the program benefits? This is not a
new issue. In many ways, the most important case in modern
constitutional law on the aggregation of power in the federal
government was in the twin decisions of Frothingham v. Mellon
and Massachusetts v. Mellon.5 The issue in those cases was
whether a citizen of a particular state, or the state itself, could
bring an action against the national government in order to
enjoin a federal expenditure program-in that case, the

4. Id. § 1607(c) ("DISTRIBUTION: After the adoption of a State
legislature's concurrent resolution, funding to the State will be for distribution
to local governments, councils of government, public entities, and public-private
entities within the State either by formula or at the State's discretion.").
5. 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (consolidated action) [hereinafter Frothingham].
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Maternity Act,6 which helped supply maternity care to young
mothers-on the grounds that it spent money for an object that
fell outside the powers delegated to Congress by the United
States Constitution.
In order to understand why this question is so important, it
is important to remember that the issue is not whether a
particular state has a right to refuse to participate in federal
spending programs, which gives rise to the dilemma that faces
South Carolina under ARRA; rather it is whether the state or its
citizens are in a position to challenge the law itself as
unconstitutional, at which point all collections from and
disbursements to all states are stopped. The first alternativerefusing money-is not going to pose any threat whatsoever to
the viability of the program, given that citizens of the United
States-and South Carolina, or Massachusetts, as the case may
be-are going to be required to contribute funds through
taxation, which are now going to be spent under whatever
allocation formula Congress devises. To decline the benefits does
not allow a citizen to refuse to pay the taxes associated with the
program, which puts all political actors-except perhaps the
heroic Governor Sanford-in a position where they have to take
the funds to programs to which their citizens have been required
to contribute. At this point, the key issue is to mount a challenge
to the program's constitutionality.
Tactically, this gives rise to a real problem of collective
action. A state has many individuals. Some of these people are in
favor of the programs, but others are opposed to the programs, so
the question is whether the dissidents can challenge a program
that a majority of the public within a given state might support
by saying that the actions in question lie outside the power of the
federal government, or that they offend one of the substantive
protections of individual rights. This issue is extremely delicate
in dealing with a structural constitution because unless there is
someone who has standing to challenge the act in court, the
promise created by Marbury v. Madison7 cannot be fulfilled.
6. Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infancy Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
67-97, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (1921) (repealed 1927).
7. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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How is judicial supremacy to be maintained if it is conceded that
an act may be unconstitutional, but neither a state, a citizen of
any state, nor a taxpayer of any state, can challenge it? It looks
as though that decision creates the classic but untenable
situation in which there is a violation of a right, but there is no
remedy that is going to be allowed to rectify it. The point here is
that if the Constitution trumps the statute, its approval by
legislative majorities cannot insulate it from judicial review.
This problem of minority challenges is not unique, I might
add, with respect to the federal government. There are all sorts
of lower-level bodies that have to face exactly the same challenge.
So for example, if you are running a corporation, and there is a
shareholder in it who thinks that your actions are ultra viresthat is beyond the power of the corporation-generally speaking,
there is a widespread rule that any individual shareholder may
challenge the expenditure or the transaction in question, and if
successful, void it and require the return of the money from the
corporation that has been distributed, or it may stop the
distribution of the funds or the property if, in fact, the
transaction has yet to be completed. The reason for allowing that
individual action is one of simple necessity. If that shareholder is
denied standing to deal with this structural matter, then no one
can address the constitutional issue, which by definition is not to
be decided by majority will. The real danger in these cases is
that no one will be willing to shoulder the cost of creating a
public good for the corporation.
In order to generate that
incentive to sue, the corporate law allows one shareholder to
bring suit to protest against an action as ultra vires. If he loses,
he gets nothing for his pains. But if he wins, so that a benefit is
gained by the corporation, typically he may be reimbursed by the
corporation for the service he provides in securing that benefit.
The same kind of rule applies with respect to municipal
government.8 If it turns out that you have a local government
that wants to make an expenditure or enter into a transaction
that is beyond its powers, any individual within that community

8. See, e.g., Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601 (1879) (allowing a
member of a total township to sue to block a contract for which the local
government had not obtained the requisite security).
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may challenge that expenditure, and if successful, the
consequences that follow on reimbursement are identical to those
that take place in the corporate context.
So then the question you have to ask-and it is the question
that Justice Sutherland had to ask when he talked about this in
Frothingham-iswhat is so special about the United States that
precludes the use of exactly the same mechanism to coordinate
citizen or state challenges that seek to prevent the illegal
exactions from taking place?
The answers that Justice
Sutherland gave to this question are to my mind entirely puny. 9
Let's start with the first point, which I think is the most decisive.
Justice Sutherland claimed that no person has standing under
Article III of the Constitution to raise this challenge. But if you
look at Article III, where is the textual ground for that
conclusion? The word standing is not there.10 The constitutional
text says that "the Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made under
their Authority.""1 Last I looked, the word "all" is not a word
which is particularly restrictive. Indeed, if you go back to civil
procedure, you will understand that a remedy in equity was
exactly the kind of remedy that was used in the shareholder's
case to enjoin-that is, to issue an injunction against the illegal
expenditures.12 Therefore, as long as the Supreme Court has
equitable jurisdiction, it seems to be able to give this type of
remedy, i.e. an injunction tailored to the case. Well, it is said that
there is no standing here because there is no case or controversy.
But that can't be. I knocked on the courtroom door to say that I
don't want this money to go out from Congress because I think it
is a violation of the Constitution. Some government official, in

9. I discuss these in Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending-The
Role of Legal and Equitable Principles,4 CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2001). For a shorter
treatment of the general question, see Richard A. Epstein, Standing in Law &
Equity: A Defense of Citizen and Taxpayer Suits, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 17 (2002).
10. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
11. Id. The point has been duly noted in Cass R. Sunstein, What's
Standing After Lujan - Of Citizen Suits, Injuries, and Article III, 91 MICH L.
REV. 163, 168 (1992).
12. See, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
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this instance Andrew Mellon, the Secretary of Treasury for the
United States, wants to make just those payments. The case has
somebody suing and somebody being sued. It takes a lawyer
with rare constitutional genius to argue that this real, down and
dirty, garden-variety fight does not rise to the dignity of a judicial
dispute between the two parties.
So then Justice Sutherland continues: well the United States
government is really a lot bigger than any local government and
a lot bigger than any corporation. True, but irrelevant. The
issue of size does not change the dynamics of a suit in equity. All
it does is make it all the more important that somebody can
represent the mass of unorganized opponents to challenge the
legislation. Once that is done, the mechanism to secure one to
step forward is exactly the same as it was before. One of the nice
things about these equitable injunctions against illegal actions is
that they are not vulnerable to differences in scale. You can
enjoin expenditures by any government, both large and small.
This one-time action, moreover, does not require that a court
provide constant oversight as to what the state or federal
government does; it just prohibits the action, knowing that
compliance is far easier than it is if there is, to take a modern
example, an order to develop a program to control carbon dioxide
emissions under the EPA.13
Now why does this analysis turn out to be so important?
Well, let me start to put the point in a slightly different fashion.
Under the original Constitution, dual sovereignty was actually
treated as a very important structural feature, with the states as
coordinate sovereigns. The only way in which dual sovereignty
will be sustained is if there are some activities that are
exclusively reserved to the states and others, which are
enumerated and defined, which are given to the federal
government. Article I, Section 8, which details the powers of
Congress, is worded in just that fashion. And those limits on
Congress's power had a lot more bite when Frothingham came
down in 1923, for the Supreme Court had not yet reached its
ultimate New Deal position on the Commerce Clause, which

13. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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made it all-embracive.14 So, there was a genuine question as to
whether those expenditures, in fact, were within the power of the
federal government.
Today, we have, in many ways, a similar problem with
respect to dual sovereignty. Because even though it turns out
that under the Commerce Clause the United States is allowed to
regulate virtually any activity that the states can regulate, there
is still a serious question as to whether or not the United States
can regulate what the states, themselves, do. You have to
understand that under the current situation, the level of federal
regulation of state authorities is completely unsatisfactory and is
indefensible even if we were to assume-although I think it is
incorrect-that the Commerce Clause has the extensive reading
that has normally been given to it. For example, under the
recent amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938originally New Deal confection-it turns out that the United
States government can set overtime pay for all state employees.15
It can tell the sheriffs how many hours they can work, what
kinds of benefits they can get, what sort of time off they can take,
and so forth.16 The only constraint the federal government has in
regulating state officials is that they have to impose the same
regulations on non-public employees;17 however, if the state
employees turn out to be highly distinctive, like being a sheriff,
the federal legislation is necessarily going to contain a level of
uniqueness anyhow.

14. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). For
my analysis, see Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Power,
73 VA. L. REV. 1357 (1987).
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2006) (dealing with maximum hours for
public employees).
16. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (construing
§ 207(o)(5) dealing with compensatory time as a substitute for overtime wages).
17. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (striking down
the attempt to extend the FLSA to state and local governments), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). National
League of Cities struck down, and Garcia sustained, the validity of Pub. L. No.
93-259m § 6(a)1,(5),(6), 88 Stat. 58 (1974), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)(s) and
(x) which together extended federal minimum wage and maximum hour laws to
almost all state and local employees.
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FROM CONSTITUTIONAL LAW TO CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS.

So, this issue turns out to be extremely important. When you
start looking at the federal programs, such as the expenditures
under ARRA, all of its purposes seem to be completely laudable.
After all, is there anyone in this room who is against economic
development? Is there anyone in this room who thinks that jobs
are a bad thing to create in a down economy with unemployment
rates hovering at ten percent? Are there people who are pleased
that the stock market has gone down as much as fifty percent
and could possibly go down some more notwithstanding the
recent recovery? There is no question that everyone seems to be
in favor of the ends that are championed in the statute. But,
whenever you are dealing with legislation-and this is, I think,
the genius of our Constitution, or at least was the genius of our
Constitution-you have to worry as much about the means side
of the problem as about the ends side of the problem.
As applied to the present stimulus program, the simple
Under the current
inquiry is whether it is constitutional.
configuration of constitutional powers, the answer is virtually
guaranteed that ARRA has no major constitutional infirmities.
But this only illustrates the great flaw of the modern American
constitutional design, which gives far too much discretion to
political figures to label as a general stimulus package dubious
programs that allow the Congress to dispense what is, in most
cases, just old-fashioned pork.
Now I am not a Keynesian, to put it mildly.18 As a matter of
general principle, I do not think increased government spending
is a good thing in a time of depression, and let me explain to you
why. If you start stimulating through federal programs, you are
necessarily going to crowd out private programs that would
otherwise be able to tap into those same resources. If you think
that the federal government can give you a multiplier effect of
2.0-so that each public dollar spent gets two new dollars of
public and private expenditures-you have to explain why
private expenditures, which are generally more efficient, cannot
18. For one short exposition of those views, see Richard A. Epstein,

Krugman's Scapegoats: Rebutting the Times Columnist's Attempt to Pin the
Market Meltdown on the Chicago School, NATIONAL REVIEW, Oct. 5, 2009, at 20.
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give you a multiplier of 3.0.
Looking at the particular provisions of the stimulus package
reveals all kinds of pork. Senator Harry Reed is a powerful man
from Nevada. One of the stimulus programs seeks to build a
railroad from Las Vegas to Los Angeles. I wonder for whose
benefit? The sad truth is that a high level of discretion at the
federal level turns out to invite large amounts of abuse. Indeed,
this sorry episode illustrates many of the structural problems
that we now face in the United States. On the one hand, we seal
off, from any kind of systematic judicial challenge, virtually all
major initiatives of the federal government that are designed to
regulate the economy comprehensively. We do the same for
legislation that imposes taxes on its key activities, often
selectively. Nonetheless, there is no one who can challenge their
validity as a citizen, as a taxpayer, or as a state. Next, you
expand the scope of the federal power under the Commerce
Clause, and with it, the scope of the federal power under the
Spending Clause. That added measure of political discretion
increases not just our collective capacity to do things well, but
alas and alack, it also increases our capacity to do them terribly.
Any effort to divine the future of this country under our current
constitutional arrangements has to be soberly cautious.
Generally speaking, Madison had it right. He said that the
forces of faction, whether they represent the majority or some
minority, will be a scourge on the land, unless you maintain tight
constraints on what governments can do.19 Yet, as matters now
stand, you will continue to see the types of stimulus programs
that we have now.
Governor Sanford, then, was wrong to try and turn down the
money for South Carolina that was given to everyone else. But I
think that the core of his insight is correct on the economics.
That point is this: if there had been no collection of the taxes, on
the one hand, and no expenditures of the revenues collected, on

19. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) ("By a faction, I
understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a
minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.").
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the other, we should have done far better than we have done
now. What was, and is still needed, is a simple broad tax
reduction that could stimulate, on a permanent basis, the private
economy. But right now there is little chance with the political
confusion in Washington that this should be done. And part of
the reason for our systematic failure is the defect in our current
world view that confers unlimited power to the political branches
of the government who have regrettably little incentive to use it
wisely.
Thank you.
Moderator: We are now ready to take questions. If you
have a question, just raise your hand and wave vigorously so that
I can see you. Here is one right down here. Yes sir?
Audience Participant: I am just wondering if, in this
debate on the allocation of public monies of tax revenues, there is
any room for the doctrine of public trust to be brought up. The
doctrine of public trust says that the government holds certain
land, certain real property, for public use and it cannot sell those
lands to private individuals. Could we say that certain tax
revenues could fall under that topic of public trust?
Epstein: That is actually a very revolutionary thesis if you
push it to all its limit. The public trust doctrine doesn't quite say
that you can never dispose of public lands. Rather, it is kind of a
fiduciary duty doctrine. What it says is that if you wish to
dispose of public lands, then you must in exchange bring some
degree of return benefit to the state, of equal or greater value
than what you have surrendered. If you apply that to taxation of
each person, it turns out that it is going to be a very exacting
requirement because if each person has to be made as well, or
better off, as he was beforehand, virtually every modern
redistributive program in the United States will fail. Now this
outcome may be a good thing, but you have to understand just
how far that the proposed use of the public trust goes.
Let me make the point in another fashion. If you are trying
to figure out if what the federal or state government has done is a
good thing, do you look simply at the process, or do you have to
look at the output of the process as well? In my view, you have
to do both. One reason that I am so down on the federal
government is that too often it uses its expansive powers to
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create tariffs, monopolies, and privileges that drive the nation
further from the preferred competitive equilibrium. I do not
think that the convoluted process typically works well. Of course,
our current processes do get legislation through, but it is far too
often legislation that is inimical to the public welfare.
Moderator: Any other questions? Right here in the front.
Audience Participant: If there was standing for a citizen to
sue, what would be the constitutional arguments that the
stimulus bill is unconstitutional-and how would you evaluate
the merits?
Epstein: Okay, first of all, the question is if there is
standing, what does it do? Let me try to clarify the relevant
issues. The only thing that standing allows a claimant to do is to
veto legislation that exceeds federal powers. No one can pass
new legislation by negating existing legislation on constitutional
grounds. Given that division of powers, separation of powers is
preserved. In fact, unless you allow someone to make that
challenge, Marbury v. Madison is effectively repealed in many
settings.
At this point the importance of standing depends on the year
about which the question is asked. For the year 2009, a
reasonable enough assumption, I think that you would find it
very difficult for anyone to maintain a successful constitutional
challenge to the bill on Commerce Clause or spending power
grounds. We read the Spending Clause in parity with the
Commerce Clause. Since the Commerce Clause is, for all intents
and purposes, all-embracing congressional authorization over
economic activities, there is no activity that is done through
spending that could not also be done directly through the
Commerce Clause, so that all programs survive.
But the 1923 debate in Frothingham differed because "Lola"
(in Damn Yankees) didn't always get what she wanted simply
because she wanted it. Then there were serious obstacles to
seeking to achieve through indirection what outcomes that could
not be achieved directly. The major illustration of that was the
Child Labor Tax Case,20 which arose after Hammer v.

20. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
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Dagenhart21'-whose result I fully support22-said that the
federal government did not have the power to prohibit goods from
being sent into interstate commerce if they were made by firms
that use child labor in any of its operations, whether or not they
were involved in the preparation of the particular goods that
were shipped across state lines. Basically, Congress sought to
regulate, through its power over trade, the means of production
internal to the state. The Supreme Court said no, that is an
illegal use of the monopoly power of the federal government to
undo the proper balance of federal/state relations. Once the
direct attack failed, Congress tried to impose a tax that did
exactly the same thing, in exactly the same circumstances. The
Child Labor Tax Case was decided the year before Frothingham,
so it was no surprise in the pre-1937 era that the Court would
conclude that if the regulation failed under the Commerce
Clause, then the substitute tax would have to fail as well.
Now the question is whether there is any way to update this
line of argument to deal with the current expenditures under
ARRA to make out the case that the states were subject to
unconstitutional conditions-if you could find out what those
were. And, I actually read Edwards v. Sanford, with just that in
mind. No luck. As you know, Chief Justice Toal is a very fine
lawyer, and she made it clear that South Carolina faced no such
problem because the stimulus package left all of the states lots of
power to spend the money they received in whatever fashion they
saw fit. It would be hard, perhaps impossible, to find any
coercion on it that would be parallel to Child Labor Tax Case.
So, the correct answer today under our modern constitutional
design is that there are no viable challenges because Marbury v.
Madison has for these purposes been undone.
The only
protections for states lie in the structural provision of the
Constitution, because even somebody with bona fide standingsomeone who is a direct victim-will be met with the claim that,
when all is said and done, the legislative process has worked so
well that there is no need for judicial review. In the end, this
uniform faith in the political processes gets courts to a uniform
21. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
22.

See

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993).
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rational basis test on all matters great and small. Yet that test is
inconsistent with any sound system of limited government.
Speaking generally, this discussion of the stimulus package
is designed to put into high relief two alternative visions of the
entire constitutional universe. I continue to defend, roughly
speaking, the original design, which in its best features has a
great deal of elegance to it. But be under no illusion. It has
precious little support in the halls of Congress and the Supreme
Court.
Moderator: Questions? We've got one over here; yes, right
here.
Audience Participant: Professor Epstein, I do not see
how-notwithstanding the flaws of factions, which Madison
warned us about, and which were true in a lot of respects-I
don't see how you can get around the argument that the citizens'
standing is the electoral process. After all, it seems to me a very
convincing argument that the standing of one taxpayer may not
be the standing of another. As a class, taxpayers might have
very little in common, in terms of their goals, motivations, and
what determines their best interests. Given that, it seems that it
is difficult to defend either taxpayer or citizen standing.
Epstein: To address this sensible objection, let's go back to
the private comparision of the corporation.
Somebody has
brought an action that says that the transaction was ultra vires
to the corporation when it also so happens that ninety-five
percent of the shareholders approve of the deal. If it is ultra
vires, then the five percent can stop what the hundred percent
can do, until the majority can get a charter amendment that
allows for this kind of transaction to go forward. Indeed, if one of
the actions of the corporation was making a distribution to
ninety-five percent of the shareholders, and leaving the other five
percent high and dry, the protection of minority interests
through litigation is not unattractive.
When you run the analysis with municipal standing, it comes
out exactly the same way. You do not insulate local government
from a constitutional challenge on ultra vires grounds by showing
that it has the support of a majority vote. If you accept that
position, in effect, no legislation could ever be challenged on
constitutional grounds, and Marbury v. Madison is effectively at
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an end. That is the risk you run with your position.
Now put the point in perspective. Remember standing does
not solve all problems. The claimant actually has to have a
credible constitutional challenge too for standing to matter. It's
not a question of walking into court and saying "Hey, I am a
taxpayer, and I have standing; therefore it is unconstitutional."
That "ergo" is much too large. As I said, and I think quite
explicitly, in Edwards, given our current configuration of both
commerce powers and spending powers, no claimant does have a
credible case, even if he has standing. In this case, under current
law, a citizen or taxpayer should have, but under current law, it
would be standing to lose.
This line of thought leads to a broader inquiry: what is the
proper role of judicial review? If, in fact, you take a benign view
of legislation, it is critical to ask whether, even when people have
undisputed standing, they will be allowed to thwart the will of
the majority? If you remember, this is the whole problem that
Alex Bickel raised with the counter-majoritarian difficulty in his
1962 book, The Least Dangerous Branch. I think that your
question has embraced his position to a very large extent. How,
in this view, does one deal with Brown v. Board of Education?23
We know that then the majority of people in South Carolina
supported segregation, so why should one person with standing
be able to thwart the majority will? I am just curious as to
exactly what-and I think it is fair to push this point-what do
you think to be the role of constitutional judicial review in a
world which takes as its high value judicial deference to the
legislature?
Nor do I think that it is possible to defend a strong restriction
on standing on the ground that it is improper to let one person
block a grand social initiative. Think back to the Supreme
Court's initial foray into the area: on that occasion, there were
two cases, Massachusetts and Frothingham,both brought against
Mellon. Massachusetts doesn't lose to any de minimis argument,
does it? So if a court is not going to allow citizens, it would still
have to allow states to sue, for surely they are not too small.

23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Conmment: In that case, the plaintiff was arguing that her
taxpayer money was going to another state, and that was just far
too remote, and what is the remedy? Are you going to enjoin the
whole statute? I mean you're going to frustrate the will of the
people by doing that.
Epstein: My point is this: there is no way the federal
government could do direct regulation on maternal care in 1923,
so why should it be able to spend money on something it could
control directly? If the doctrine of enumerated powers applies,
this circumvention of basis powers raises a very troublesome
issue: the whole point about structural issues is that they are not
tied to individual harms, and that is what's so wrong with the
modern standing doctrine-it concentrates on the law side, which
is always looking at concrete industries, but the text has the
equity side, and somebody has to figure out why equitable
remedies are designed to enjoin and protect people in structural
ways, so as to make sure minorities don't get overrun in any
context where they are vulnerable to expropriation. Why should
anyone leave out the equity side of the story in developing a
complete constitutional account? And it is interesting that the
Supreme Court in its own jurisdiction has never once stressed
that word; it has always stressed the other half of it. And Justice
Scalia, who's the major champion of this, always analogized the
Article III jurisdiction to tort suits.24 In fact, historically, it was
the other way around. Putting equitable jurisdiction into the
federal courts was an immense choice in 1789 because its
exercise was associated with royal power as far back as the
Coke/Ellsmere disputes in the early seventeenth century. 25 All of
a sudden the Constitution gave the federal courts the kinds of
power that the chancery courts had when they were thought to
be the tools of the king. But at a more mundane level, this
political uneasiness could not last. It is not possible to run a
judicial world unless you have injunctions and specific
performance, which are equitable remedies. So the Founders
gave that jurisdiction to the federal courts. I don't see why they

24. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 55 (1992).
25. For one discussion, see Mark Fortier, Equity and Ideas: Coke,
Ellesmere, and James I, 51 RENAISSANCE Q. 1255 (1998).
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can't use that head of jurisdiction if it is in the Constitution in
black and white. I'm not trying to be a modern anti-textualist.
I'm trying to be a real textualist that takes every word seriously.
Next, I don't think that the numerosity issue is persuasive
even in its own terms. Let there be one disgruntled taxpayer in
New York City out of seven million and that person can challenge
the legislation. Not enough, so ask for a thousand taxpayers.
Give me any number you want; I could always in modern
parlance organize a "tea party" to reach that level. To me
numerosity is a detail at best.
Moderator: Let's take another question. Yes, you in the
back there.
Audience Participant: Professor Epstein, I am uneasy with
the use of a judicial remedy, when there is always a political
remedy available, namely voting people out of office.
Epstein: The point obviously matters because the electoral
check is one major feature of a well-functioning democracy.
While no one should disparage it, we should also understand its
limitations. One limitation is the difficulty with the political
remedy of voting out of office those politicians whom the public
thinks have acted against the Constitution is that it cannot hone
in on particular issues. That was also a serious difficulty for
Locke in dealing with the crown, which cannot be voted out of
office. So he had to turn to the right of revolution, which led to
an "Appeal to Heaven,"26 which was part of Locke's basic
structure in which parliament limited the power of the king.
Locke did not have a system that embedded judicial review. So
by default he said, in effect, the only way to deal with unjust
governments is to have an appeal, i.e., a political appeal to
heaven, meaning that the people take up arms against the
government
The difficulty with that solution, however, arises with a
26. JOHN LOCKE, A SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. XIV, § 168 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690) ("The people have no

other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth,
but to appeal to heaven: for the rulers, in such attempts, exercising a power the
people never put into their hands, (who can never be supposed to consent that
any body should rule over them for their harm) do that which they have not a
right to do.").
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Congress-not this Congress-that does nine things of ten well,
and one thing out of ten things badly. If you're talking about the
political remedy of voting them out, you have the bundling
problem. The voters are going to have to get rid of the guys that
have done ninety percent of the things right, because they've
done ten percent of the things wrong. If the Constitution,
however, incorporates judicial review, with generous standing, a
selective challenge becomes possible. The court can knock out
one bad law and leave the other nine good laws in place. The
people don't have to throw out the current government because
there is a more targeted remedy.
This rule applies in really important cases. I would hate, for
example, to think that a court would say that "Gee, Brown v.
Board of Education involves a real abuse of the judicial process,
so that it is best to wait for Congress to do something about it in
another fifteen to twenty years." It's not as though this judicial
review always works as well as it should. But whatever its
shortfalls, it is wise to ask courts to be pretty confident that there
is a constitutional violation before it intervenes. Judges should
not act casually, any more than rebellions against arbitrary
authority should be undertaken lightly, as Locke himself
insisted. So in close cases judges should give a nod to legislative
supremacy. But there are a lot of cases out there, in my mind,
which are not close. Indeed, the whole reason for elaborate
procedures was that legislatures could misbehave. Sometimes
these devices fail, and when they do, courts should intervene.
There are risks of over-intervention, but as I look at the sausage
that comes out of Congress these days, I don't confuse it with
prime beef. Much of this legislation, if meat, would be removed
from the market by a diligent FDA, if it only knew what it was
supposed to do. (Laughter).
Audience Member: Could you please comment on your
views on Marbury v. Madison and its impact of those principles
today on judicial review?
Epstein: Yes, I think Marbury v. Madison is a genuine
puzzle, but let me see if I can go back and unpack the puzzle from
the beginning. The original decision was one which just asked
whether or not Congress could require the Supreme Court to
accept original jurisdiction over matters that did not fall into the
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Constitution's grant of power to the Court. What the Court said
is that we have the power to assert the limits on our own
jurisdiction, and Congress cannot force upon us matter over
which we do not have jurisdiction. And so the only institutional
assumption needed to make that model of judicial power work is
to simply assume that the three branches are coordinated so that
no one can force its will on the others. You do not need judicial
supremacy to get that position; you just need to have a sense that
the court can act defensively. Indeed, for a long time it was
uncertain as to whether or not the Court had the offensive power,
that is judicial supremacy to negate what Congress did.
The key case on this came surprisingly late in the 1958 case
of Cooper v. Aaron,27 which came in the midst of the segregation
battle in Little Rock, Arkansas. The issue there was whether or
not the Supreme Court could order Governor Oryal Forbes to
integrate the schools. It's not a question of the Court keeping its
own internal jurisdiction in order; what happened was that
Eisenhower was unwilling to enter that local battle unless he had
the Supreme Court telling him that he had this thing to do. So
this is a case of someone who wanted to intervene but
desperately wanted to have the cloak of legitimacy that a
Supreme Court decision would offer. So, Cooper made it very
clear that the Supreme Court is boss man on the block and could
block anything which did not involve the exercise of judicial
power, besides the federal judicial system, but had influences
beyond that.
And what Frothingham did, and maybe it's
unfortunate, was to go back to the very narrow version of judicial
review, before the broad version was ever established. What it
essentially said was we can't tell these guys, and if Congress
thinks it's within its power to pass this stuff, well then that's
fine.
The difficulty you get with that is that once Congress passes
a law that imposes a notoriously invidious tax on someone-say
one that's race-based-what happens once it tries to collect this
tax through judicial action? The government then asks the court
to make him pay a tax that Congress thinks is constitutional. But

27. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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the Supreme Court balks because it sees in the tax a flat
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. So there is no tax
collection. But if on the other hand, the government seizes
property and the Court orders its return, the Executive can then
say it does not have to yield to that judgment, so the government
keeps the money. The equal spheres view of constitutional
interpretation thus runs the risk of creating these terrible
impasses where the rules on collections and refunds differ totally.
The situation gets only worse if the President has a different
interpretation of the law than the Congress, which creates yet
another layer of difficulty.
It is complications like this which leave everyone in practice
comfortable with the judicial supremacy view of Marbury v.
Madison. President Eisenhower liked it in Cooper v. Aaron
because he wanted some judicial cover for a tricky political
situation. Indeed, historically, the only way the civil rights
movement took off was to have one judicial decision after another
negating state or federal statutes as inconsistent with the
Constitution, followed by the federal decision to withhold school
aid from schools that did not comply with federal desegregation
mandates.2S And, you know, for the most part, I'm quite
sympathetic to the judicial intervention because, obviously, I
don't want to defend "big government," which is what segregation
turned out to be. But this whole episode shows how important it
is to turn judicial review into a consistent theory and not just a
bird of passage to be invoked opportunistically.
Now in dealing with ARRA, we're only talking about
economics issues, which is a far cry from race, where the reaction
is: "Oh my God, we can't let these scoundrels do what they've
done! We've got to be tough!" But being tough on segregation does
not require us to back off on economic issues. I prefer a more
consistent view across different categories, as my book on
Takings29 suggests. That is why, in general, I have thought that

28. For a fuller account, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (urging the futility of Brown
without additional federal pressure).
29. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF

EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
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the standing doctrine simply cuts off too many meritorious
causes at the gate. For many little people, democratic politics are
dominated by big guys, in and out of government. Yet on a daily
basis, we have to worry about a licensing statute that prevents a
small person from practicing his or her trade. What kind of
campaign is that person going to be able to mount when the
opposition is large, established companies with more resources?
One of the organizations I work with, the Institute for Justice,
specializes in bringing actions for braiders and taxicab drivers
against various government agencies. The IJ is an anti-monopoly
organization on behalf of the little people. And there are other
organizations that may be on the other side of the political
spectrum that share this common view. That is why I worked
with the Mandel Legal Aid Clinic at the University of Chicago
Law School to help secure relief for harsh forfeiture laws in
Alvarez v. Smith,3o now before the Supreme Court.31 Democratic
politics are a death knell to certain needed reforms. Not only do
we have to look with suspicion on the standing doctrine, we have
to be concerned about rational basis review in economic cases.
Moderator: Questions? Yes, right here.
Audience Participant: If an individual does not have
standing in front of the federal government, can you find the
tipping point where individuals could state "we have standing"?
You say "one individual is not enough"-will there ever be
"enough" individuals?
Epstein: That position was raised by Eugene Kontorovich,
now an Associate Professor of Law at Northwestern Law School,
who argued that standing may exist if one can demonstrate to
the court that there is a group that is more representative of a
large group of taxpayers instead of just one. 32 I am not in favor
of restrictions that don't restrict, so you don't want to develop a
theory as to why it's necessary. There is an organization out
30. No. 08-351 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinion
s/09pdf/08-351/pde, vacating as moot Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834
(7th Cir. 2008).
31. On December 8, 2009, subsequent to the date of this speech, the
Supreme Court vacated the case as moot. Id.
32. Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663
(2007).
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there known as the National Organization of Taxpayers, and I
could click my fingers, once groups had taxpayer standing; I
could form one in every state in a matter of twenty-four hours.
So, if these groups have standing, then you get all the issues
before the court, and it's no different from a class action. It's just
permissive joinder, rather, where everyone comes together on a
voluntary basis. Well, if that's going to happen, why not let the
one person do it-you just change the caption at the top of a piece
of paper. All the institutional issues are going to be exactly the
same in both group and individual suits. Is this law ultra vires,
and if so, do we care? And is judicial supremacy the model? And,
you know, I'm very uneasy about judicial supremacy-it's
certainly not part of the original Constitution.
One of the most powerful elements in the anti-Originalist
side of the constitutional debate is that, with time, the law
develops a kind of constitutional prescriptive right. If you go
back to the original decisions, Marbury is very tenuous, for
reasons just developed. It turns out when you're trying to find
out whether or not the federal government can review state
decisions for being unconstitutional, the decision in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee33 is dubious as well. But these decisions have
been around for about 200 years, each of them, and to have a
nation that's worked well with these cases in place makes it
inadvisable, at this late date, to come forward and blow up bombs
in public places.
So if I had to answer the question, what is the strongest
argument for defending the standing limitations, I'd say, we've
followed the no standing regime for over eighty years, why do you
want to change it now, Professor Epstein? And the answer to
that is, I think, the other changes worked pretty well but I don't
think the standing restrictions have worked well, given that the
greatest problem we have today in the United States is the
relentless expansion of the public sector. In the past decade, all
of our increase in employment is in regulation and none of it is in
production. This is, in part, a direct consequence of the fact that
there is no viable restraint on the way in which the government

33. 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (reviewing Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789).
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regulates, the way in which the government taxes, and the way
in which the government subsidizes various economic activities.
I say every time government takes initiatives that go beyond a
simple flat tax, or go beyond the prevention of fraud and
monopoly-type issues, it puts itself into negative sum mode. I
think what we are now doing is seeing the cumulative impact of
these miscalculations whose combined effect leaves everybody
more nervous.
So, I want to change standing, and I know why. Just the way
in 1954, I would not say "Gee, you know Plessy v. Ferguson34 has
been on the books now for 58 years; that's a long time in
constitutional history, so we really ought not to touch it." No, I
think that would have been a terrible mistake. I think some of
these settled expectations you expect to keep, and some of them
are bad, and the hard part of Constitutional law is to decide what
counts as a good thing and what counts as a bad thing. There is
an irreducible element of judgment in constitutional law, just as
there is in figuring out how to work the private law of
prescription, where the first possession rule is in constant
tension with the adverse possession rules.35
Comment I think there's another practical problem with
taxpayer standing. Putting aside the legal issues, if you have a
single taxpayer that can join the implementation of a programmaybe a jobs program or the banking bill-what do you do to the
economy as a whole? Whether you think the TARP [Troubled
Asset Relief Program] bill was a good thing or a bad thing, the
policy maker said we need it in order to restore the confidence in
the population to maybe get people spending again; this spending
program was put out there. If you enjoin that, what does that do
to the economy? What would that have done to the confidence of
the taxpayer? Now, I know there's a broad delegation of authority
in that TARP legislation to the treasury department, primarily
because it was put together so quickly, and I think as a trade off
to doing that, Congress had put in an Inspector General who was
not like other Inspector Generals, who are accountable to any

34. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
35. See Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in
the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 667 (1986).

HeinOnline -- 4 Charleston L. Rev. 417 2009-2010

CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW

[Volume 4

particular department. They put in an Inspector General only
accountable to Congress. So, I think that was the way Congress
was trying to protect the taxpayer's interests when they adopted
this bill so quickly.
But I think that would create a real disruption in the
economy at this time, if a taxpayer was able to simply go in and
enjoin the enactment of that law.
Epstein: There's a very instructive case that shows the peril
of precipitate action. The standing issue loomed very large in the
Chrysler bankruptcy dispute,36 and in fact, the whole miserable
scheme, which was a public outreach, survived because of two
applications of the standing doctrines. Now, most of you, like me,
are not bankruptcy experts nor do you care much about the fine
points. But essentially what happened was the United States
government wanted to rescue Chrysler. To do so, they wanted to
give it a partner and the partner was going to be Fiat, who didn't
contribute a single dime. At this point, the Washington planners
had to deal with a group of secured creditors who took priority
over unsecured creditors. When the dust settled, essentially all
of the money in this business went to the United Auto Workers
(UAW), but the secured creditors received thirty cents on the
dollar.
How did it take place? Nobody was allowed to challenge
the bill. So when the Indiana Police Department wanted to
challenge the bill, they said these assets are worth $2 billionyou've got your $2 billion in secured creditors. You can't
complain about what's going on. Now how do we know the assets
were worth $2 billion? Well, the government bid $2 billion to
control the deal. But it didn't bid $2 billion for the assets; they
bid $2 billion to buy the assets, because they agreed to assume
about $5 billion of liabilities. It's a complete sham! Nobody would
ever give a positive sum for a business whose liabilities exceed its
assets. So essentially, the government just put a number of the
assets to block off any complaints about the structure of the deal.

36. For a fuller discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, PoliticalBankruptcies:
How Chrysler and GM Have Changed the Rules of the Game, THE FREEMAN,
Dec. 2009, available at http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/political-bank
ruptcies-how-chrysler-and-gm-have-changed-the-rules-of-the-game/#.
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The transaction did not allow the going-concern value of Chrysler
to be determined because the entire restructuring was not
conducted in the ordinary course of business.
None of this mattered. The Supreme Court,37 the Second
Circuit,38 and then the Bankruptcy Court39 all said no standing.
I think they were wrong. So then, you get all this money going
from the public money into New Chrysler. But the statute says
that the money's supposed to go to "financial institutions." So
what the government does is to put the cash into Chrysler, which
then gives a $5 billion note to the UAW pension fund. The real
question is whether an operating company, or its pension fund,
should be regarded as a financial institution. But was there
anyone who could challenge the government action? No. And
why not? Because the taxpayer standing rule bars the suit. And
so what you have now is set of judicial decisions that are not
going to restore confidence in the stability of our credit
institutions.
Why? Because the Chrysler deal, quite consciously, inverted
the priorities of various classes of creditors for a short-term
political advantage. The entire operation of the American credit
economy depends, however, upon all secured and unsecured
creditors knowing their place in the queue so that they can price
their obligations accordingly and figure out how to manage their
loan portfolios. So when standing doctrines say nobody can
challenge massive government irregularities, it's a serious blow
to the stability of credit arrangements. So how did this happen?
It turns out that the government lawyers just beat the poor
pension funds into a pulp. In fact, when there was some question
as to whether the big pension players would join in the
opposition, they did not. Rumors have flown that since they were
getting TARP funds, they were told discreetly by high
government officials, "no, you better stay off of this." There have
been lots of undocumented complaints that the heavy hitters
pulled out because of government pressures. Nor does it stop

37. Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 556 U.S.

S. Ct. 2275 (2009).
38. See In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009).
39. In re Chrysler, 405 B.R. 84 (2009).
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here. The standing doctrine is a danger because it blocks any
serious review of highly dubious programs, free of judicial
interference. Not good.
Comment: Please discuss the speed with which Congress
passed the TARP funds bill. That speed suggests that it was a
bipartisan, political, and hasty decision which conflicted with the
long, slow, cumbersome process that the Framers intended.
Epstein: One of the reasons Congress and the President do
things so fast is because there's nobody who's in the position to
challenge their actions. So, it's easy to just pull through if you
think that your lawyers could run the real auction. One of the
things to understand is that no side has an advantage in good
lawyers. Both the American Constitution Society and the
Federalist Society, have excellent lawyers working for them fulltime because the stakes loom so large. What we really have to
think about is not the excellence of the lawyers but the rules of
the game. At this point in time, the rules manage to spawn so
much uncertainty that key segments of the population sense the
lack of stable legal institutions and social arrangements. And
that is the single largest reason why economic recovery will not
take place as quickly as might be hoped. The fact that there's
this political angle over all prudential investment adds a
dimension of risk to a market that is already saturated with
economic uncertainty. This nation cannot tolerate both economic
and political uncertainty simultaneously, which is why the
unemployment numbers are holding steady around ten percent
and are not going to get better until we change our entire way of
doing business, which is not likely to happen in the short run.
This is a happy conversation (Audience laughter). Oh and by the
way, I want you to know (pointing to his cell phone which had
rung during the statement), I just enjoined a federal judge who
was calling. It's great fun to put them on hold, I have to tell you
(Audience laughter).
Moderator: We are just about out of time, so let me ask you
a question that several people had. Back in July of 2007, the
Stock Market had hit an all-time high at 14,000. A little over a
year later, it was nearly half that, and now we are in the mess
that we are in. Can you briefly state how we got here and what
should the government do to get us out?
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Epstein: Sure. What the government should do is get us out
is to get out of the business of lending money (One audience
member claps). I got one lonely round of applause! (Audience
laughter followed by audience applause). It's a bipartisan fiasco
to some extent. Easy money essentially makes the purchase of
complementary goods appear cheaper than they are, so you get
an asset bubble. Getting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into this
business gave you more cheap money, dumb guarantees, and
terrible loans, and somehow leading figures in the federal
government thought that what was lost on each individual loan
could be made up in volume, which if you do the multiplication, is
moving in the wrong direction. There is no diversification if all
parts of the loan portfolio are doing lousy for the same reason.
There's just going to be more and more losses. They didn't see
that. Why, I cannot say.
Then on the securities side, it seemed to be that the marketto-market rules, which are very complicated, probably
encouraged the downward cascade. When you force banks to sell
in a market that's not very liquid, and in which the prices are
unstable, all the buyers are going to hang back. When they hang
back, prices are driven lower. That in turn is going to drive other
banks into insolvency, so by the time the cycle is done, everybody
is trying to sell, which leaves only one person left to buy, which
turns out, of course, to be Uncle Sam.
Next, we have to stop roiling other markets simultaneously
with the unrest in financial markets. If you want to get stability
in the financial market, you have to rethink the labor statutes, or
just drop the whole package. You have to cut way back on the
health stuff-there are lots of things to fix, but they're not fixing
them in the right way. And then you have to rethink the whole
carbon-control program because it's much too intrusive. Right
now there are three major regulatory programs that are being
advanced under the illusion of the balanced budget in a time of a
depression. I know Barack Obama personally. One thing I can
tell you for sure is that his skill set does not cover economic
issues.
(Big applause).
Moderator: Thank you very much. We have got to close.
Thank you.
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